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Abstract—A malicious insider in a wireless network may carry
out a number of devastating attacks without fear of retribution,
since the messages it broadcasts are authenticated with valid
credentials such as a digital signature. In attributing an attack
message to its perpetrator by localizing the signal source, we can
make no presumptions regarding the type of radio equipment
used by a malicious transmitter, including the transmitting power
utilized to carry out an exploit. Hyperbolic position bounding
(HPB) provides a mechanism to probabilistically estimate the
candidate location of an attack message’s originator using re-
ceived signal strength (RSS) reports, without assuming knowledge
of the transmitting power. We specialize the applicability of HPB
into the realm of vehicular networks and provide alternate HPB
algorithms to improve localization precision and computational
efﬁciency. We extend HPB for tracking the consecutive locations
of a mobile attacker. We evaluate the localization and tracking
performance of HPB in a vehicular scenario featuring a variable
number of receivers and a known navigational layout. We ﬁnd
that HPB can position a transmitting device within stipulated
guidelines for emergency services localization accuracy.
Index Terms—Insider Attacks, Location Estimation, Vehicular
Networks, Mobile Networks, Wireless Security, Wireless Net-
works
I. INTRODUCTION
Insider attacks pose an often neglected threat scenario when
devising security mechanisms for emerging wireless tech-
nologies. For example, trafﬁc safety applications in vehicular
networks aim to prevent fatal collisions and preemptively warn
drivers of hazards along their path, thus preserving numer-
ous lives. Unmitigated attacks upon these networks stand to
severely jeopardize their adoption and limit the scope of their
deployment.
The advent of public key cryptography, where a node is
authenticated through the possession of a public/private key
pair certiﬁed by a trust anchor, has addressed the primary
threat posed by an outsider without valid credentials. But a
vehicular network safeguarded through a Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) is only as secure as the means implemented to
protect its member nodes’ private keys. An IEEE standard has
been proposed for securing vehicular communications in the
Dedicated Short Range Communications Wireless Access in
Vehicular Environments (DSRC/WAVE) [12]. This standard
advocates the use of digital signatures to secure vehicle safety
broadcast messages, with tamper proof devices storing secret
keys and cryptographic algorithms in each vehicle. Yet a con-
vincing body of existing literature questions the resistance of
such devices to a motivated attacker, especially in technologies
that are relatively inexpensive and readily available [2], [3].
In the absence of strict distribution regulations, for example
if tamper proof devices for vehicular nodes are available off
the shelf from a neighborhood mechanic, a supply chain exists
for experimentation with these devices for the express purpose
of extracting private keys. The National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) has established a certiﬁcation process
to evaluate the physical resistance of cryptographic processors
to tampering, according to four security levels [20]. However,
tamper resistance comes at a price. High end cryptographic
processors certiﬁed at the highest level of tamper resistance
are very expensive, for example an IBM 4764 coprocessor
costs in excess of 8000 USD [11]. Conversely, lower end
tamper evident cryptographic modules, such as smartcards,
feature limited mechanisms to prevent cryptographic mate-
rial disclosure or modiﬁcation and only provide evidence
of tampering after the fact [25]. The European consortium
researching solutions in vehicular communications security,
SeVeCom, has highlighted the existence of a gap in tamper
resistant technology for use in vehicular networks [23]. While
low end devices lack physical security measures and suffer
from computational performance issues, the cost of high end
modules is prohibitive. The gap between the two extremes
implies that a custom hardware and software solution is
required, otherwise low end devices may be adopted and prove
to be a boon for malicious insiders.
Vehicle safety applications necessitate that each network
device periodically broadcast position reports, or beacons.
A malicious insider generating false beacons whose digital
signature is veriﬁable can cause serious accidents and possibly
loss of life. Given the need to locate the transmitter of false
beacons, we have put forth a mechanism for attributing a
wireless network insider attack to its perpetrator, assuming
that a malicious insider is unlikely to use a digital certiﬁcate
linked to its true identity. Any efforts to localize a malicious
transmitter must assume that an attacker may willfully attempt
to evade detection and retribution. As such, only information
that is revealed outside a perpetrator’s control can be utilized.A number of existing wireless node localization schemes
translate the radio signal received signal strength (RSS) at a
set of receivers into approximated transmitter-receiver (T-R)
distances, in order to position a transmitter. However, these as-
sume that the effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP) used by
the signal’s originator is known. While this presumption may
be valid for the location estimation of reliable and cooperative
nodes, a malicious insider may transmit at unexpected EIRP
levels in order to mislead localization efforts and obfuscate its
position. Our hyperbolic position bounding (HPB) algorithm
addresses a novel threat scenario in probabilistically delimiting
the candidate location of an attack message’s originating de-
vice, assuming neither the cooperation of the attacker nor any
knowledge of the EIRP [14]. The RSS of an attack message at
a number of trusted receivers is employed to compute multiple
hyperbolic areas whose intersection contains the source of the
signal, with a degree of conﬁdence.
We demonstrate herein that the HPB mechanism is resistant
to varying power attacks, which are a known pitfall of RSS-
based location estimation schemes. We present three variations
of HPB, each with a different algorithm for computing hy-
perbolic areas, in order to improve computational efﬁciency
and localization granularity. We extend HPB to include a
mobile attacker tracking capability. We simulate a vehicular
scenario with a variable number of receiving devices, and
we evaluate the performance of HPB in both localizing and
tracking a transmitting attacker, as a function of the number of
receivers. We compare the HPB performance against existing
location accuracy standards in related technologies, including
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) guidelines
for localizing a wireless handset in an emergency situation.
Section II reviews existing work in vehicular node location
determination and tracking. Section III outlines the HPB
mechanism in its generic incarnation. Section IV presents three
ﬂavours of the HPB algorithm for localizing and tracking a
mobile attacker. Section V evaluates the performance of the
extended HPB algorithms. Section VI discusses the simulation
results obtained. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A majority of wireless device location estimation schemes
presume a number of constraints that are not suitable for
security scenarios. We outline these assumptions and compare
them against those inherent in our HPB threat model in [13].
For example, a number of publications related to the location
determination of vehicular devices focus on self-localization,
where a node seeks to learn its own position [4], [21].
Although the measurements and information provided to these
schemes are presumed to be trustworthy, this assumption does
not hold for ﬁnding an attacker invested in avoiding detection
and eviction from the network.
Some mechanisms for the localization of a vehicular de-
vice by other nodes are based on the principle of location
veriﬁcation, where a candidate position is proposed, and some
measured radio signal characteristic, such as time of ﬂight or
RSS, is used to conﬁrm the vehicle’s location. For example
in [10] and [6], Hubaux, Capkun and Luo adapt Brands and
Chaum’s distance bounding scheme [5] for this purpose. Yet
a degree of cooperation is expected on the part of an attacker
for supplying a position. Additionally, specialized hardware
is necessary to measure time of ﬂight, including nanosecond-
precision synchronized clocks and accelerated processors to
factor out relatively signiﬁcant processing delays at the sender
and receiver. Xiao et al. [26] employ RSS values for location
veriﬁcation, but they assume that all devices, including ma-
licious ones, use the same EIRP. An attacker with access to
a variety of radio equipment is unlikely to be constrained in
such a manner.
Location veriﬁcation schemes for detecting false position
reports may be beacon-based or sensor-based. Leinm¨ uller
et al. [16] ﬁlter beacon information through a number of
plausibility rules. Because each beacon’s claimed position
is corroborated by multiple nodes, consistent information is
assumed to be correct, based on the assumption of an honest
majority of network devices. This presumption leaves the
scheme vulnerable to Sybil attacks [8]. If a rogue insider can
generate a number of Sybil identities greater than the honest
majority, then the attacker can dictate the information corrob-
orated by a dishonest majority of virtual nodes. In ensuring
a unique geographical location for a signal source, our HPB-
based algorithms can detect a disproportionate number of co-
located nodes.
Tang et al. [24] put forth a sensor-based location veriﬁcation
mechanism where video sensors, such as cameras and RFID
readers, can identify license plates. However, cameras perform
sub-optimally when visibility is reduced, for example at night
or in poor weather conditions. This scheme is supported by
PKI-based beacon veriﬁcation and correlation by an honest
majority, which is also vulnerable to insider and Sybil attacks.
Another sensor-based mechanism is suggested by Yan et
al. [27], using radar technology for local security and the
propagation of radar readings through beacons on a global
scale. Again, an honest majority is assumed to be trustworthy
for corroborating the beacons, both locally and globally.
Some existing literature deals explicitly with mobile device
tracking, including the RSS-based mechanisms put forth by
Mirmotahhary et al. [19] and by Zaidi and Mark [28]. These
presume a known EIRP and require a large number of trans-
mitted messages so that the signal strength variations can be
ﬁltered out.
III. HYPERBOLIC POSITION BOUNDING
The log-normal shadowing model predicts a radio signal’s
large scale propagation attenuation, or path loss, as it travels
over a known T-R distance [22]. The variations in signal
strength experienced in a particular propagation environment,
also known as the signal shadowing, behave as a log-normal
random variable with mean zero and a standard deviation
obtained from experimental measurements. In this model, the
path loss over T-R distance d is computed as:
L(d) =L(d0) + 10´ log(
d
d0
) + X¾ (1)
where d0 is a pre-deﬁned reference distance close to the
transmitter, L(d0) is the average path loss at the referencedistance, and ´ is a path loss exponent dependent upon the
propagation environment. The signal shadowing is represented
by a random variable X¾ with zero mean and standard
deviation ¾.
In [14], we adapt the log-normal shadowing model to
estimate a range of T-R distance differences, assuming that
the EIRP is unknown. The minimum and maximum bounds
of the distance difference range between a transmitter and a
receiver pair Ri and Rj, with conﬁdence level C, are computed
as:
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where RSSk is the RSS measured at receiver Rk, [P¡,P+]
represents a dynamically estimated EIRP interval, z =
©¡1(1+C
2 ) represents the normal distribution constant asso-
ciated with a selected conﬁdence level C, and [¡z¾;+z¾] is
the signal shadowing interval associated with this conﬁdence
level. The amount of signal shadowing taken into account in
the T-R distance difference range is commensurate with the
degree of conﬁdence C. For example, a conﬁdence level of
C = 0:95, where z = 1:96, encompasses a larger proportion
of signal shadowing around the mean path loss than C = 0:90,
where z = 1:65. A higher conﬁdence level, and thus a larger
signal shadowing interval, translates into a wider range of T-R
distance differences.
Hyperbolas are computed at the minimum and maximum
bounds, ¢d
¡
ij and ¢d
+
ij respectively, of the distance difference
range. The resulting candidate hyperbolic area for the location
of a transmitter is situated between the minimum and maxi-
mum hyperbolas and contains the transmitter with probability
C. The intersection of hyperbolic areas computed for multiple
receiver pairs bounds the position of a transmitting attacker
with an aggregated degree of conﬁdence, as demonstrated
in [15].
IV. LOCALIZATION AND TRACKING
OF MOBILE ATTACKERS
We demonstrate that by dynamically computing an EIRP
range, we render the HPB mechanism impervious to varying
power attacks. We propose three variations of HPB for com-
puting sets of hyperbolic areas and the resulting candidate
areas for the location of a transmitting attacker. We also
describe our HPB-based approach for estimating the mobility
path of a transmitter in terms of location and direction of
travel.
A. Mitigating Varying Power Attacks
The use of RSS reports has been criticized as a sub-optimal
tool for estimating T-R distances due to their vulnerability to
varying power attacks [7]. An attacker that transmits at an
EIRP other than the one expected by a receiver can appear
to be closer or farther simply by transmitting a stronger or
weaker signal. Our HPB-based algorithms are immune to such
an exploit, since no ﬁxed EIRP value is expected. Instead,
measured RSS values are leveraged to compute a likely EIRP
range, as demonstrated in Heuristic 1.
In order for HPB to compute a set of hyperbolic areas be-
tween pairs of receivers upon detection of an attack message,
a candidate range [P¡,P+] for the EIRP employed by the
transmitting device must be dynamically estimated. We use
the RSS values registered at each receiver, as well as the log-
normal shadowing model captured in Equation (1) for this
purpose. The path loss L(d) is replaced with its equivalent,
the difference between the EIRP and the RSSk measured at
a given receiver Rk. Our strategy takes the receiver with the
maximal RSS as an approximate location for the transmitter
and computes the EIRP range a device at those coordinates
would need to employ in order for a signal to reach the other
receivers with the RSS values measured for the attack message.
We begin by identifying the receiver measuring the maximal
RSS for an attack message. Given that this device is likely to
be situated in nearest proximity to the transmitter, we deem it
the reference receiver. For every other receiving device Rk, we
use the log-normal shadowing model to calculate the range of
EIRP [P
¡
k ,P
+
k ] that a transmitter would employ for a message
to reach Rk with power RSSk, assuming the transmitter is lo-
cated at exactly the reference receiver coordinates. The global
EIRP range [P¡,P+] for the attack message is calculated as
the intersection of all receiver-computed ranges [P
¡
k ,P
+
k ].
Heuristic 1. EIRP Range Computation. Let R be the set of
all receivers within range of an attack message. Let e Rm be
the maximal RSS receiver and thus be estimated as the closest
receiver to the message transmitter, such that e Rm 2 R and
RSSm ¸ RSSj for all Rj 2 R. Given that EIRP = L(d0)+
10´ log(d=d0) + RSS + X¾ from the log-normal shadowing
model, let the EIRP range [P
¡
k ,P
+
k ] at any receiver Rk be
determined, with conﬁdence C, as:
P
¡
k = L(d0) + 10´ log(dmk=d0) + RSSk ¡ z¾ (4)
P
+
k = L(d0) + 10´ log(dmk=d0) + RSSk + z¾ (5)
where dmk is the Euclidian distance between Rk and e Rm, for
any Rk 2 R n fe Rmg.
The estimated EIRP range [P¡,P+] employed by a trans-
mitter is the intersection of receiver-computed EIRP intervals
[P
¡
k ,P
+
k ] within which every receiver Rk 2 R n fe Rmg can
reach e Rm. Since P¡ must be smaller than P+, we iterate
through the ascending ordered sets fP
¡
k g and fP
+
k g, for all
Rk 2 R n fe Rmg, to ﬁnd a supremum of EIRP values with
minimal shadowing that is lower than an inﬁmum of maximal
shadowing EIRP values. Assuming the size of R is n, and thus
the size of Rnfe Rmg is n¡1, we compute the estimated EIRP
range [P¡,P+] as follows:
1: i ( n ¡ 1
2: j ( 1
3: while i > 0 and j < n do
4: if P
¡
i < P
+
j then
5: P¡ ( P
¡
i
6: P+ ( P
+
j7: exit
8: end if
9: if i > 1 then
10: if P
¡
i¡1 < P
+
j then
11: P¡ ( P
¡
i¡1
12: P+ ( P
+
j
13: exit
14: end if
15: end if
16: i ( i ¡ 1
17: j ( j + 1
18: end while
The only case where the pseudo-code above can fail is if
every P
¡
i is greater than every P
+
j for all 1 · i;j · n ¡
1. This is impossible, since Equations (4) and (5) together
indicate that for any k, P
¡
k must be smaller than P
+
k .
The log-normal shadowing model indicates that, for a ﬁxed
T-R distance, the expected path loss is constant, albeit subject
to signal shadowing, regardless of the EIRP used by a trans-
mitter. Any EIRP variation induced by an attacker translates
into a corresponding change in the RSS values measured by
all receivers within radio range. As a result, an EIRP range
computed with Heuristic 1 incorporates an attacker’s power
variation and is commensurate with the actual EIRP used, as
are the measured RSS reports. The values cancel each other out
when computing an HPB distance difference range, yielding
constant values for the minimum and maximum bounds of this
range, independently of EIRP variations.
Lemma 1. Varying Power Effect. Let R be the set of all
receivers within range of an attack message. Let a proba-
ble EIRP range [P¡,P+] for this message be computed as
set forth in Heuristic 1. Let the distance difference range
[¢d
¡
ij;¢d
+
ij] between a transmitter and receiver pair Ri;Rj
be calculated according to Equations (2) and (3). Then any
increase (or decrease) in the EIRP of a subsequent message
inﬂuences a corresponding proportional increase (or decrease)
in RSS reports, effecting no measurable change in the range of
distance differences [¢d
¡
ij;¢d
+
ij] estimated with a dynamically
computed EIRP range.
Proof: Let an original EIRP range [P
¡
k ;P
+
k ] computed
for all receivers Rk 2 R yield an estimated global EIRP
range [P¡,P+]. Let a new varying power attack message be
transmitted such that the EIRP includes a power increase (or
decrease) of ¢P. Then for every Rk 2 R, the corresponding
[ RSSk for the new attack message reﬂects the same change
in value from the original RSSk, for [ RSSk = RSSk + ¢P.
Given new [ RSSk values for all Rk 2 R, the resulting EIRP
range [b P¡; b P+] computed with Heuristic 1 include the same
change ¢P over the original range of values [P¡;P+]:
b P¡ = supfb P
¡
k g
= supfL(d0) + 10´ log(dmk=d0) + [ RSSk ¡ z¾g
= supfL(d0) + 10´ log(dmk=d0) + RSSk + ¢P ¡ z¾g
= supfP
¡
k + ¢Pg
= P¡ + ¢P
Conversely, we see that b P+ = P+ + ¢P.
As a result, the distance difference range [¢b d
¡
ij;¢b d
+
ij] for the
new message is equal to the original range [¢d
¡
ij;¢d
+
ij]:
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The same logic can be used to demonstrate that ¢b d
+
ij = ¢d
+
ij.
A varying power attack is thus ineffective against HPB, as
the placement of hyperbolic areas remains unchanged.
B. HPB Algorithm Variations
The HPB mechanism estimates the originating location of
a single attack message from a static snapshot of a wireless
network topology. Given sufﬁcient computational efﬁciency,
the algorithm executes in near real-time to bound a malicious
insider’s position at the time of its transmission.
Hyperbolic areas constructed from Equations (2) and (3) are
used by HPB to compute a candidate area for the location of
a malicious transmitter.
Deﬁnition 1. Hyperbolic Area. Let G be the set of all (x;y)
coordinates in the Euclidian space within radio range of a
malicious transmitter. Let H
¡
ij be the hyperbola computed from
the minimum bound of the distance difference range between
receivers Ri and Rj with conﬁdence level C, as deﬁned by
Equation (2). Let H
+
ij be the hyperbola computed from the
maximum bound of the distance difference range between Ri
and Rj with the same conﬁdence, as deﬁned by Equation (3).
Then we deﬁne the hyperbolic area Aij as situated between
the hyperbolas H
¡
ij and H
+
ij with conﬁdence level C. More
formally, if ±(a;b) represents the Euclidian distance between
any two points a and b, then:
Aij =
©
pk : ¢d
¡
ij · ±(pk;Ri) ¡ ±(pk;Rj) · ¢d
+
ij
for all pk 2 G
ª
where ¢d
¡
ij and ¢d
+
ij are deﬁned in Equations (2) and (3).
A set of hyperbolic areas may be computed according to
three different algorithms, depending on the set of receiver
pairs considered.
Deﬁnition 2. Receiver Pair Set. Let ­ be any set of unique
receivers Rk. Then S­ is deﬁned as the exhaustive set of
unique, ordered receiver pairs in ­:
S­ = ffRi;Rjg : Ri;Rj 2 ­ and i < jg
where sh 6= sk for all sh;sk 2 S­ where h 6= k, and jS­j = ¡n
2
¢
where n = j­j.Our original HPB algorithm employs all possible combina-
tions of receiver pairs to compute a set of hyperbolic areas. The
intersecting space of the hyperbolic areas yields a probable
candidate area for the location of a transmitter.
Algorithm 1. A®: All-pairs Algorithm. The all-pairs algo-
rithm A® computes hyperbolic areas between every possible
pair of receivers. Let R be the set of all receivers within range
of an attack message. Let SR represent the set of all unique,
ordered receiver pairs in R, as put forth in Deﬁnition 2. Then
the set of hyperbolic areas H® between all receiver pairs is
stated as follows:
H® =
©
Aij;Aji : Aij;Aji are computed as in Def. 1
for every fRi;Rjg 2 SR ª
The A® algorithm generates hyperbolic areas for every
possible receiver pair, for a total of
¡n
2
¢
pairs given n receivers,
as put forth in Algorithm 1. While this approach works
adequately for four receivers, additional receiving devices have
the effect of dramatically increasing computation time, as
well as reducing the success rate due to the accumulated
amount of signal shadowing excluded. The HPB execution
time is based on the number of hyperbolic areas computed,
which in turn is contingent upon the number of receivers.
For A®, n receivers locate a transmitter with a complexity
of
¡n
2
¢
=
n£(n¡1)
2 ¼ O(n2).
An alternate algorithm A¯ aims to scale down the com-
putational complexity by reducing the number of hyperbolic
areas. We separate the set of all receivers into subsets of size r.
Each receiver subset computes an intermediate candidate area
as the intersection of the hyperbolic areas constructed from
all receiver pair combinations within that subset. The ﬁnal
candidate area for a transmitter consists of the intersection of
the intermediate candidate areas computed over all receiver
subsets.
Algorithm 2. A¯: r-pair Set Algorithm. The r-pair set
algorithm A¯ groups receivers in subsets of size r, computes
intermediate candidate areas for each subset using the all-
pairs approach within the subset, and yields an ultimate
candidate area for a transmitter as the intersection of the
receiver subset intermediate candidate areas. Let R be the
set of all receivers within range of an attack message. Let ª
represent the disjoint partition of (m¡1) sets of r receivers,
with the mth element of ª containing the remaining receivers:
ª =
©
Ãk : Ãk µ R for 1 · k · m
and jÃkj = r if k < m
and 2 · jÃkj · r if k = m
ª
where Ãh \ Ãk = ; for all Ãh;Ãk 2 ª with h 6= k. Let
SÃk represent the set of all unique, ordered receiver pairs in
a given set of receivers Ãk 2 ª , as put forth in Deﬁnition 2.
Then the set of hyperbolic areas H¯ computed for sets of r
receivers is stated as follows:
H¯ =
©
Aij;Aji : Aij;Aji are computed as in Def. 1
for every fRi;Rjg 2 SÃk for all Ãk 2 ª
ª
For the A¯ algorithm, the number of hyperbolic areas
depends on the set size r, as well as the number of re-
ceivers n. Thus A¯ locates a transmitter with a complexity
of (n
r +1)£
¡r
2
¢
¼ O(n). For a small value of r, for example
r = 4, the execution time is proportional to at most (3n
2 +6).
A third HPB algorithm, the perimeter-pairs variation A°,
is proposed to bound the geographic extent of a candidate
area within an approximated transmission range, based on the
coordinates of the receivers situated farthest from a signal
source. We establish a rudimentary perimeter around a trans-
mitter’s estimated radio range, with the logical center of this
range calculated as the centroid of all receiver coordinates.
The range is partitioned into four quadrants from the center,
along two perpendicular axes. Four perimeter receivers are
identiﬁed as the farthest in each quadrant from the center.
Hyperbolic areas are computed between all combinations of
perimeter receiver pairs, as well as between every remaining
non-perimeter receiver and the perimeter receivers in the other
three quadrants.
Algorithm 3. A°: Perimeter-pairs Algorithm. The perimeter-
pairs algorithm A° partitions a transmitter’s radio range
into four quadrants. Four perimeter receivers are determined.
Hyperbolic areas are computed between all pairs of perimeter
receivers, as well as between every perimeter receiver and
the non-perimeter receivers of other quadrants. Let R be the
set of all receivers within range of an attack message. Let
RÂ = (xc;yc) be the centroid of all Ri 2 R. Let Q be
the disjoint set of all receivers Ri 2 R partitioned into four
quadrants from the centroid RÂ:
Q =
©
Qk : Qk = fRi : Ri 2 R and Ri = (xi;yi) and
xi ¸ xc and yi ¸ yc for k = 1
xi < xc and yi ¸ yc for k = 2
xi < xc and yi < yc for k = 3
xi ¸ xc and yi < yc for k = 4g
ª
Let the set N of perimeter receivers contain one receiver ½k
for each of the four quadrants, such that ½k is the farthest
receiver from the centroid RÂ in quadrant k:
N = f½k : ½k = qi such that qi 2 Qk and
±(qi;RÂ) ¸ ±(qj;RÂ) for all qj 2 Qk
for all Qk 2 Qg
where ±(a;b) represents the Euclidian distance between any
two points a and b. Also let the set of non-perimeter receivers
in a given quadrant be determined as all receivers in that
quadrant other than the perimeter receiver:
N = f½k : ½k = fQk n f½kgg for every Qk 2 Qg
Let SN represent the set of all unique, ordered perimeter
receiver pairs, as put forth in Deﬁnition 2. Then the set of
hyperbolic areas H° is stated as follows:
H° =
©
Aij;Aji : Aij;Aji are computed as in Def. 1
for every fRi;Rjg 2
©
SN [ ffRi;Rjg :
Ri = ½k for every ½k 2 N and Rj 2 ½m
for every ½m 2 N where m 6= kg
ª ªFor example, Figure 1 illustrates a transmitter T and a
set of receivers. The grid is partitioned into four quadrants
from the computed receiver centroid. The set of perimeter
receivers, as the farthest receivers from the centroid in each
quadrant (I to IV), form a rudimentary bounding area for
the location of the transmitter. The A° algorithm computes
hyperbolic areas between all pairs of perimeter receivers, in
this case between all possible pairs in N = fR3;R4;R7;R5g.
Additional receiver pairs are formed between the remaining
non-perimeter receivers fR1;R2;R6;R8g and the perimeter
receivers of other quadrants. Receiver R6, for instance, is
situated in quadrant II, so it is included in a receiver pair
with each perimeter receiver in fR3;R7;R5g.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
T
 
 
R
1
R
2
R
3
R
4
R
5
R
6
R
7
R
8
I II
III IV
Transmitter
Centroid
Receiver
Perimeter Rcvr
Fig. 1. Example of Perimeter Receivers
In terms of complexity, the A° algorithm is equivalent to
A¯. Given n receivers and four perimeter receivers such that
jNj = 4, A° executes in time
¡4
2
¢
+3(n¡4) = 3n¡6 ¼ O(n).
The candidate area for the location of a malicious transmit-
ter is computed as the intersection of a set of hyperbolic areas,
H®, H¯, or H°, determined according to Algorithm 1, 2 or 3.
Deﬁnition 3. Candidate Area. Let G be the set of all (x;y)
coordinates in our sample Euclidian space. Let V µ G be
the subset of all coordinates situated on the road layout of a
vehicular scenario. Then the grid candidate area GA`, where
` 2 f®;¯;°g, is deﬁned as the subset of grid points in G
situated in the intersection of every hyperbolic area computed
according to Algorithm A®, A¯ or A°.
GA` =
©
pk : pk 2 G and pk 2
h·m \
h=1
Ah 2 H`
where ` 2 f®;¯;°g and m = jH`j
ª
Similarly, the vehicular candidate area V A`, where ` 2
f®;¯;°g, is deﬁned as the subset of vehicular layout points
in V situated in the intersection of every hyperbolic area
computed according to Algorithm A®, A¯ or A°.
V A` =
©
pk : pk 2 V and pk 2
h·m \
h=1
Ah 2 H`
where ` 2 f®;¯;°g and m = jH`j
ª
While a candidate area contains a malicious transmitter with
probability C, the tracking of a mobile device requires that
a unique point in Euclidian space be deemed the likeliest
position for the attacker. In free space, we can use the centroid
of a candidate area, which is calculated as the average of all
the (x;y) coordinates in this area. In a vehicular scenario, we
use the road location closest to the candidate area centroid.
Deﬁnition 4. Centroids. The grid centroid of a given GA,
denoted as GÂ, consists of the average (x;y) coordinates of
all points within the GA.
GÂ = (xG;yG); such that xG =
jGAj X
i=1
xi
jGAj
and yG =
jGAj X
i=1
yi
jGAj
;
for all pi = (xi;yi) 2 GA
The vehicular centroid of a given V A, represented as V Â, is
the closest vehicular point to the average coordinates of all
points within the V A.
V Â = vk; such that vk 2 V and ph = (xV ;yV ); where
xV =
jV Aj X
i=1
xi
jV Aj
and yV =
jV Aj X
i=1
yi
jV Aj
;
for all pi = (xi;yi) 2 V A;
and ±(ph;vk) · ±(ph;vj); for all vj 2 V
C. Tracking a Mobile Attacker
We extend HPB to approximate the path followed by a
mobile attacker, as it continues transmitting. By computing
a new candidate area for each attack message received, a
malicious node can be tracked using a set of consecutive
candidate positions and the direction of travel inferred between
these points. We establish a mobility path in our vehicular
scenario as a sequence of vehicular layout (x;y) coordinates
over time, along with a mobile transmitter’s direction of travel
at every point.
Deﬁnition 5. A mobility path P is deﬁned as a set of
consecutive coordinates pi = (xi;yi) and angles of travel µi
over a time interval T.
P =
©
fpi;µig : pi = (xi;yi) is the transmitter location
at ti 2 T and µi = atan2 (yi ¡ yi¡1;xi ¡ xi¡1)
ª
where atan2 is an inverse tangent function returning values
over the range [¡¼;+¼] to take direction into account. 1
In order to approximate the dynamically changing position
of an attacker, we discretize the time domain T into a series of
1As ﬁrst deﬁned for the Fortran 77 programming language [1]time intervals ti. At each discrete ti, we sample a snapshot of
the vehicular network topology consisting of a set of receiving
devices and their locations. Our approach is analogous to
the discretization phase in digital signal processing, where
a continuous analog radio signal is sampled periodically for
conversion to digital form. We thus estimate the mobility path
P taken by an attacker by executing an HPB algorithm for an
attack message received at every interval ti over a time period
T. The vehicular centroids of the resulting candidate areas
constitute the estimated attacker positions, and the angle from
one estimated point to the next determines the approximated
direction of travel.
Algorithm 4. Mobile Attacker Tracking. Let M be the set
of consecutive attack messages received over a time interval.
Then the estimated mobility path b P of a transmitter over the
message base M is computed as follows:
b P =
©
(^ pi; ^ µi) : ^ pi = (^ xi; ^ yi) = V Âi for mi 2 M
and ^ µi = atan2 (^ yi ¡ ^ yi¡1; ^ xi ¡ ^ xi¡1)
ª
For every attack message mi 2 M, an estimated transmitter
location ^ pi must be determined. An execution of HPB using
the RSS values corresponding to mi yields a vehicular candi-
date area V Ai, as put forth in Deﬁnition 3. The road centroid
of V Ai is computed as V Âi, according to Deﬁnition 4. It is
by deﬁnition the closest point in the vehicular layout to the
averaged center of the V Ai, and thus the natural choice for
an estimated value ^ pi of the true transmitter location pi. The
direction of travel of a transmitter is stated in Deﬁnition 5 as
the angle between consecutive positions in Euclidian space.
We follow the same logic to compute the estimated direction
of travel ^ µi between transmitted messages mi¡1 and mi as
the angle between the corresponding estimated positions ^ pi¡1
and ^ pi.
Example. Figure 2 depicts an example mobility path of
a malicious insider, with consecutive traveled points labeled
from 1 to 20. The transmitter broadcasts an attack message at
every fourth location, labeled as points 4, 8, 12, 16 and 20.
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Fig. 2. Example of Attacker Mobility Path
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Fig. 3. Example of Mobile Attacker Localization
For each attack message, we execute the A° HPB variation,
for conﬁdence level C = 0:95, using eight randomly positioned
receivers, and a vehicular candidate area V A° is computed.
The estimated locations and directions of travel are depicted
in Figure 3. The initial point’s direction of travel cannot be
estimated, as there is no previous point from which to ascertain
a traveled path. In this example, point 4 is localized at 100
meters from its true position, points 8, 16 and 20 at 25 meters,
while point 12 is found in its exact location.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We describe a simulated vehicular scenario to evaluate the
localization and tracking performance of the extended HPB
mechanisms described in Section IV-B. In order to model a
mobile attacker transmitting at 2.4 GHz, we employ Rappa-
port’s log-normal shadowing model [22] to generate simulated
RSS values at a set of receivers, taking into account an inde-
pendently random amount of signal shadowing experienced at
each receiving device. According to Rappaport, the log-normal
shadowing model has been used extensively in experimental
settings to capture radio signal propagation characteristics,
in both indoor and outdoor channels, including in mobility
scenarios. In our previous work, we have evaluated HPB
results with both log-normal shadowing simulated RSS values
and RSS reports harvested from an outdoor ﬁeld experiment at
2.4 GHz [13]. We found that the simulated and experimental
location estimation results are nearly identical, indicating that
at this frequency, the log-normal shadowing model is an
appropriate tool for generating realistic RSS values.
We compare the success rates of the A®, A¯ and A°
algorithms at estimating a malicious transmitter’s location
within a candidate area, as well as the relative sizes of the grid
and vehicular candidate areas. We model a mobile transmitter’s
path through a vehicular scenario and assess the success in
tracking it by measuring the distance between the actual and
estimated positions, in addition to the difference between the
approximated direction of travel and the real one.N
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Fig. 4. Urban Scenario – Richmond, Ontario
A. Hyperbolic Position Bounding of Vehicular Devices
Our simulation uses a one square kilometer urban grid, as
depicted in Figure 4. We evaluate the all-pairs A®, 4-pair
set A¯ and perimeter-pairs A° HPB algorithms with four,
eight, 16 and 32 receivers. In each HPB execution, four of
the receivers are ﬁxed road-side units (RSUs) stationed at
intersections. The remaining receivers are randomly positioned
on-board units (OBUs), distributed uniformly on the grid
streets. Every HPB execution also sees a transmitter placed
at a random road position within the inner square of the
simulation grid. We assume that in a sufﬁciently dense urban
setting, RSUs are positioned at most intersections. As a result,
any transmitter location is geographically surrounded by four
RSUs within radio range. For each deﬁned number of receivers
and two separate conﬁdence levels C 2 f0:95;0:90g, the HPB
algorithms, A®, A¯ and A°, are executed 1000 times. For
every execution, RSS values are generated for each receiver
from the log-normal shadowing model. We adopt existing
experimental path loss parameter values from large scale
measurements gathered at 2.4 GHz by Liechty et al. [17], [18].
From ´ = 2:76 and a signal shadowing standard deviation
¾ = 5:62, we augment the simulated RSS values with an
independently generated amount of random shadowing to
every receiver in a given HPB execution. Since the EIRP used
by a malicious transmitter is unknown, a probable range is
computed according to Heuristic 1.
For every HPB execution, whether the A®, A¯ or A°
algorithm is used, we gather three metrics: the success rate
in localizing the transmitter within a computed candidate area
GA; the size of the unconstrained candidate area GA as a
percentage of the one square kilometer grid; and the size
of the candidate area restricted to the vehicular layout V A
as a percentage of the grid. The success rate and candidate
area size results we obtain are deemed 90% accurate within
a 2% and 0.8% conﬁdence interval respectively. The average
HPB execution times for each algorithm on an HP Pavilion
laptop with an AMD Turion 64 £ 2 dual-core processor are
shown in Table I. As expected from our complexity analysis,
the A® variation is markedly slower, and the computational
costs increase as additional receivers participate in the location
estimation effort. For example in the case of eight receivers, a
single execution of A° takes 23 ms, while A® requires over
100 ms.
TABLE I
AVERAGE HPB EXECUTION TIME (SECONDS)
# Rcvrs A° A¯ A®
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
4 0.005 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.023 0.001
8 0.023 0.001 0.045 0.001 0.104 0.003
16 0.075 0.001 0.090 0.002 0.486 0.142
32 0.215 0.059 0.195 0.053 2.230 0.766
The comparative success rates of the A®, A¯ and A°
approaches are illustrated in Figure 5, for conﬁdence level
C = 0:95. While A° exhibits the best localization success
rate, every algorithm sees its performance degrade as more
receivers are included. With four receivers for example, all
three variations successfully localize a transmitter 94-95% of
the time. However with 32 receivers, A° succeeds in 79%
of the cases, while A¯ and A® do so in 71% and 50% of
executions. Given that each receiver pair takes into account
an amount of signal shadowing based on the conﬁdence level
C, it also probabilistically ignores a portion (1 ¡ C) of the
shadowing. As more receivers and thus more receiver pairs
are added, the error due to excluded shadowing accumulates.
The results obtained for conﬁdence level C = 0:90 follow the
same trend, although the success rates are slightly lower.
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Fig. 5. Success Rate for C = 0:95
Figures 6 and 7 show the grid and vehicular candidate area
sizes associated with our simulation scenario, as computed
with algorithms A®, A¯ and A°, for conﬁdence level C =
0:95. The size of the grid candidate area GA corresponds to
21% of the simulation grid, with four receivers, for both A¯
and A®, while A° narrows the area to only 7%. In fact, the A°
approach exhibits a GA size that is independent of the number
of receivers. Yet for A¯ and A®, the GA size is noticeably
lower with additional receivers. This ﬁnding reﬂects the use of
perimeter receivers with A°. These specialized receivers serveto restrict the GA to a particular portion of the simulation grid,
even with few receivers. However, this variation does not fully
exploit the presence of additional receiving devices, as these
only support the GA determined by the perimeter receivers.
The size of the vehicular candidate area V A follows the same
trend, with a near constant size of 0.64% to 1% of the grid for
A°, corresponding to a localization granularity within an area
less than 100 m £ 100 m, assuming the transmitter is aboard
a vehicle traveling on a road. The A¯ and A® algorithms
compute vehicular candidate area sizes that decrease as more
receivers are taken into account, with A® yielding the best
localization granularity. But even with four receivers, A¯ and
A® localize a transmitter within a vehicular layout area of
1.6% of the grid, or 125 m £ 125 m.
Generally, both the GA and V A sizes decrease as the
number of receivers increase, since additional hyperbolic areas
pose a higher number of constraints on a candidate area, thus
decreasing its extent. We see in Figures 6 and 7 that A¯
consistently yields larger candidate areas than A® for the
same reason, as A® generates a signiﬁcantly greater number of
hyperbolic areas. For example, while A® computes an average
GA® of 10% and 3% of the simulation grid with eight and
16 receivers, A¯ yields areas of 15% and 9% respectively. By
contrast, A° yields a GA size of 5-6%, but its reliability is
greater, as demonstrated by the higher success rates achieved.
The nearly constant 5% GA size computed with A° has an
average success rate of 81% for 16 receivers, while the 9%
GA generated by A¯ is 79% reliable and the 3% GA obtained
with A® features a dismal 68% success rate. Indeed, Figures 5
and 6 taken together indicate that smaller candidate areas
provide increased granularity at the cost of lower success rates,
and thus decreased reliability. This phenomenon is consistent
with the intuitive expectation that a smaller area is less likely
to contain the transmitter.
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Fig. 6. Grid Candidate Area Size for C = 0:95
B. Tracking a Vehicular Device
We generate 1000 attacker mobility paths P, as stipulated
in Deﬁnition 5, of 20 consecutive points evenly spaced at
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Fig. 7. Vehicular Candidate Area Size for C = 0:95
every 25 meters. Each path begins at a random start location
along the central square of the simulation grid depicted in
Figure 4. We keep the simulated transmitter location within
the area covered by four ﬁxed RSUs, presuming that an
inﬁnite grid features at least four RSUs within radio range
of a transmitter. The direction of travel for the start location
is determined randomly. Each subsequent point in the mobile
path is contiguous to the previous point, along the direction
of travel. Upon reaching an intersection in the simulation
grid, a direction of travel is chosen randomly among the
ones available from the current position, excluding the reverse
direction.
The A®, A¯ and A° algorithms are executed at every
fourth point pi of each mobility path P, corresponding to a
transmitted attack signal at every 100 meters. The algorithms
are executed for conﬁdence levels C 2 f0:95;0:90g, with
each of four, eight, 16 and 32 receivers. In every case, the
receivers consist of four static RSUs, and the remainder are
OBUs randomly placed at any point on the simulated roads.
For each execution of A®, A¯ and A°, a vehicular can-
didate area V A is computed, and its centroid V Â is taken
as the probable location of the transmitter, as described in
Algorithm 4. Two metrics are aggregated over the executions:
the root mean square location error, as the distance in meters
between the actual transmitter location pi and its estimated
position ^ pi = V Âi; and the root mean square angle error
between the angle of travel µi for each consecutive actual
transmitter location and the angle ^ µi computed for the ap-
proximated locations.
The location error for the A®, A¯ and A° algorithms,
given conﬁdence level C = 0:95, is illustrated in Figure 8.
As expected, the smaller V A sizes achieved with a greater
number of receivers for A® and A¯ correspond to a more
precise transmitter localization. The location error associated
with the A® algorithm is smaller, compared to A¯, for the
same reason. Correspondingly, the nearly constant V A size
obtained with A° yields a similar result for the location
error. For instance with conﬁdence level C = 0:95, eight and
16 receivers produce a location error of 114 and 79 meters      4   8   16   32  
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Fig. 8. Location Error for C = 0:95
respectively with A®, but of 121 and 102 meters with A¯.
The location error with A° is once more nearly constant, at
96 and 91 meters. The use of all receiver pairs to compute
a V A with A® allows for localization that is up to 40-50%
more precise than grouping the receivers in sets of four or
relying on perimeter receivers when 16 or 32 receiving devices
are present. Despite its granular localization performance, the
A® approach works best with large numbers of receivers,
which may not consistently be realistic in a practical setting.
Another important disadvantage of the A® approach lies in
its large complexity of O(n2) for n receivers, when compared
to A¯ and A° with a complexity of O(n), as discussed in
Section IV-B.
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Fig. 9. Location Error for Vehicular Candidate Area Size
Figure 9 plots the root mean square location error in terms
of V A size for the three algorithms. While A® and A¯
yield smaller V As for a large number of receivers, the V As
computed with A° offer more precise localization with respect
to their size. For example, a 0.7% V A size obtained with A°
features a 96 meter location error, while a similar size V A
computed with A¯ and A® generate a 102 and 114 meter
location error, respectively.
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Fig. 10. Direction of Travel Angle Error for C = 0:95
The error in estimating the direction of travel exhibits little
variation in terms of number of receivers and choice of HPB
algorithm, as shown in Figure 10. With eight and 16 receivers,
for conﬁdence level C = 0:95, A¯ approximates the angle
of travel between two consecutive points within 77± and 71±
respectively, whereas A® estimates it within 76± and 63±. A°
exhibits a slightly higher direction error at 76± and 77±. It
should be noted that for all three algorithms, for all numbers
of receivers, the range of angle errors only spans 14±. So
while the granularity of localization is contingent upon the
HPB methodology used and the number of receivers, the three
variations perform similarly in estimating the general direction
of travel.
VI. DISCUSSION
The location error results of Figure 8 shed an interesting
light on the HPB success rates discussed in Section V-A. For
example in the presence of 32 receivers, for conﬁdence level
C = 0:95, only 50% of A® executions yield a candidate area
containing a malicious transmitter, as shown in Figure 5. Yet
the same scenario localizes a transmitter with a root mean
square location error of 45 meters of its true location, whether
it lies within the corresponding candidate area or not. This
indicates that while a candidate area may be computed in
the wrong position, it is in fact rarely far from the correct
transmitter location. This may be a result of our strict deﬁ-
nition of a successful execution, where only a candidate area
in the intersection of all hyperbolic areas is considered. We
have observed in our simulations that a candidate area may
be erroneous solely because of a single misplaced hyperbolic
area, which results in either a wrong location or an empty
candidate area. In our simulations tracking a mobile attacker,
we notice that while A° and A¯ generate an empty V A
for 10% and 14% of executions, A® does so in 31% of the
cases. This phenomenon is likely due to the greater numberof hyperbolic areas generated with the A® approach and the
subsequent greater likelihood of erroneously situated hyper-
bolic areas. While the success rates depicted in Figure 5 omit
the executions yielding empty candidate areas as inconclusive,
future work includes devising a heuristic to re-compute a set of
hyperbolic areas in the case where their common intersection
is empty.
In comparing the location accuracy of HPB with related
technologies, we ﬁnd that, for example, differential GPS
devices can achieve less than 10 meter accuracy. However, this
technology is better suited to self-localization efforts relying
on a device’s assistance, and cannot be depended upon for the
position estimation of a non-cooperative adversary. The FCC
has set forth regulations for the network-based localization of
wireless handsets in emergency 911 call situations. Service
providers are expected to locate a calling device within 100
meters 67% of the time and within 300 meters in 95% of
cases [9]. In the minimalist case involving four receivers,
the HPB perimeter-pairs variation A° localizes a transmitting
device with a root mean square location error of 107 meters.
This translates into a location accuracy of 210 meters in 95%
of cases and of 104 meters in 67% of executions. While the
former case is fully within FCC guidelines, the latter is very
close. With a larger number of receivers, for example eight
receiving devices, A° yields an accuracy of 188 meters 95%
of the time and of 93 meters in 67% of cases. Although HPB
is designed for the location estimation of a malicious insider,
its use may be extended to additional applications such as
911 call origin localization, given that its performance closely
matches the FCC requirements for emergency services.
VII. CONCLUSION
We extend a hyperbolic position bounding (HPB) mech-
anism to localize the originator of an attack signal within
a vehicular network. Because of our novel assumption that
the message EIRP is unknown, the HPB location estimation
approach is suitable to security scenarios involving malicious
or uncooperative devices, including insider attacks. Any coun-
termeasure to this type of exploit must feature minimalist
assumptions regarding the type of radio equipment used by an
attacker and expect no cooperation with localization efforts on
the part of a perpetrator.
We devise two additional HPB-based approaches to com-
pute hyperbolic areas between pairs of trusted receivers by
grouping them in sets and establishing perimeter receivers.
We demonstrate that due to the dynamic computation of
a probable EIRP range utilized by an attacker, our HPB
algorithms are impervious to varying power attacks. We extend
the HPB algorithms to track the location of a mobile attacker
transmitting along a traveled path.
The performance of all three HPB variations is evaluated
in a vehicular scenario. We ﬁnd that the grouped receivers
method yields a localization success rate up to 11% higher
for a 6% increase in candidate area size over the all-pairs
approach. We also observe that the perimeter-pairs algorithm
provides a more constant candidate area size, independently of
the number of receivers, for a success rate up to 13% higher
for a 2% increase in candidate area size over the all-pairs
variation. We conclude that the original HPB mechanism using
all pairs of receivers produces a smaller localization error than
the other two approaches, when a large number of receiving
devices are available. We observe that for a conﬁdence level of
95%, the former approach localizes a mobile transmitter with a
granularity as low as 45 meters, up to 40-50% more precisely
than the grouped receivers and perimeter-pairs methods. How-
ever, the computational complexity of the all-pairs variation is
signiﬁcantly greater, and its performance with fewer receivers
is less granular than the perimeter-pairs method. Of the two
approaches with complexity O(n), the perimeter-pairs method
yields a success rate up to 8% higher for consistently smaller
candidate area sizes, location and direction errors.
In a vehicular scenario, we achieve a root mean square
location error of 107 meters with four receivers and of
96 meters with eight receiving devices. This granularity is
sufﬁcient to satisfy the FCC-mandated location accuracy reg-
ulations for emergency 911 services. Our HPB mechanism
may therefore be adaptable to a wide range of applications
involving network-based device localization assuming neither
target node cooperation nor knowledge of the EIRP.
We have demonstrated the suitability of the hyperbolic
position bounding mechanism for estimating the candidate
location of a vehicular network malicious insider and for
tracking such a device as it moves throughout the network.
Future research is required to assess the applicability of the
HPB localization and tracking mechanisms in additional types
of wireless and mobile technologies, including wireless access
networks such as WiMAX/802.16.
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